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It is holden, and so it hath been resolved, that divided kingdoms under several
kings. . . are sanctuaries for servants or subjects flying for safety from one
kingdom to another; and, upon demand made by them, are not, by the laws
and liberties of kingdoms, to be delivered ....
--Lord Coke1
The Supplementary Extradition Treaty would exclude specified crimes of vio-
lence, typically committed by terrorists, from the scope of the political offense
exception to extradition. It therefore represents a significant step to improve
law enforcement cooperation and counter the threat of international terrorism
and other crimes of violence.
-George Shultz
Secretary of State2
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States-United Kingdom Supplementary Extradition
Treaty, ratified by the U.S. Senate on July 17, 1986, narrows extradi-
tion law's political offense exception by limiting its scope to include
only purely political and non-violent crimes. The Supplementary
Treaty is largely a response to recent cases in which federal magis-
trates have used the political offense exception to refuse British extra-
dition requests for accused or convicted Provisional Irish Republican
Army terrorists. This Note first discusses extradition generally and
the political offense exception in particular. The Note then examines
the Supplementary Treaty as submitted and the legislative debate
which resulted in the finally ratified compromise version. The Note
contends that, although the compromise version of the Supplementary
Treaty represents a reasonable approach to closing the terrorist loop-
hole in extradition relations between the United States and the United
Kingdom, the treaty as originally submitted reflected a more responsi-
ble approach than does the compromise version.
II. BACKGROUND
Formal extradition is the legal process by which one state (the
"requested state") delivers to another state (the "requesting state") a
person charged with or convicted of a criminal offense against the laws
of the requesting state so that the person may be tried or punished
under the laws of the requesting state.3
1. E. CLARKE, A TREATISE UPON THE LAW OF EXTRADITION 7 (3d ed. 1888) (quot-
ing E. COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND 180 (rev.
ed. 1797)).
2. Letter from George Shultz to Ronald Reagan (July 3, 1985) (submitting the Sup-
plementary Extradition Treaty to the President), reprinted in S. TREATY Doc. 99-8, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. V-VI (1985).
3. According to the United States Supreme Court, "[e]xtradition is the surrender to
another country of one accused of an offence against its laws, there to be tried, and, if found
guilty, punished." Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 709 (1893).
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A. EXTRADITION GENERALLY
International law establishes no legal duty to extradite. Many
countries rely on general principles of international law to govern
extradition; the United States and United Kingdom, however, rely
exclusively upon extradition treaties.4 The extradition process allows
two sovereign states to cooperate in rendering fugitives to one another
without diminishing either state's sovereignty.5 The practice of extra-
dition dates to relations between the different provinces of the Roman
Empire.6 The earliest known treaty, the Egyptian-Hittite Peace
Treaty of 1280 B.C., included an extradition agreement for the surren-
der of political enemies. 7 In contrast to modern practice, extradition in
early history usually involved requests for the surrender of persons
accused of political offenses.8 Such ancient cooperation evolved into
an international network of treaties specifying both the offenses cov-
ered and the substantive requirements for extradition.
B. THE POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION
Even where the requesting state complies with the substantive
requirements of extradition, the requested state may nevertheless deny
extradition on the basis of certain specific exceptions or exclusions.9
The political offense exception recognizes that circumstances may
exist under which, in the interest of free expression of political dissent,
acts which might normally be cause for extradition should be
4. See generally M. BAssIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUB-
LIC ORDER 6-9 (1974). Although almost all nations possess some extradition treaties,
many possess relatively few. For example, some states enter into treaties only with states
with which they have territorial contiguity or close commercial ties, or with states that
extradite only pursuant to a treaty. Id. The United States, in contrast, has treaties with
nearly one hundred states, an approach to extradition shared by Great Britain. Id. at 9.
British practice has been consistent in refusing to extradite apart from statute and treaty.
Id. at 7. In the United States, the Supreme Court laid down a similar principle in 1840.
Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540 (1840); see also M. BASSIOUNI, supra, at 7. Since 1840, the
United States has steadfastly maintained this attitude. Id.; see infra note 23 and accompa-
nying text.
5. Blakesley, Extradition Between France and the U.S.: An Exercise in Comparative
and International Law, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 653, 655 (1980).
6. E. CLARKE, supra note 1, at 16.
7. I. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (1971).
8. E. CLARKE, supra note 1, at 18. "Nations felt little need to cooperate in the sup-
pression of ordinary crime, while political and religious dissidents remained a threat to the
sovereign's power as long as they found sanctuary elsewhere." Comment, Unraveling the
Gordian Knot: The United States Law of International Extradition and the Political
Offender Exception, 3 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 141, 143 (1980).
9. 2 M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION IN U.S. LAW AND PRACTICE ch.
VIII (1983). Extradition may be denied for grounds relating to: the offense charged; the
relator; the criminal charge or the prosecution of the offense charged; or the penalty and
punishability of the relator. The political offense exception relates to the offense charged.
Id.
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exempted from the extradition process.10
The political offense exception "evolved both from benevolent
attitudes towards the underlying conduct of which the refugee was
accused and concerns for the fairness of trial and punishment in the
requesting state."11 Although the earliest extradition cases generally
involved political offenses, the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw
increasing toleration of political and religious dissidents. 12 Today,
almost all extradition treaties provide that persons accused or con-
victed of political offenses need not be extradited.13 Such treaties,
however, seldom define the term "political offense."14 Although no
uniform international definition of a political offense exists, '5 most
attempts to define the term include two major classifications of polit-
ical offenses: pure and relative.1 6
Pure political offenses are acts directed against the existence and
functioning of the state. 17 These offenses affect the public interest, not
private rights. 18 Examples include treason, sedition, and espionage.19
Unlike the pure political offense, a relative political offense affects
a private right or interest. Relative political offenses are ordinary
crimes committed with political motives.20 For example, when a ter-
10. See Note, State Department Determinations of Political Offenses: Death Knell for
the Political Offense Exception in Extradition Law, 15 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 137, 138-
39 (1983).
11. Banoff & Pyle, "To Surrender Political Offenders" The Political Offense Exception
to Extradition in United States Law, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & P. 169, 180 (1984).
12. Comment, supra note 8, at 143.
13. 6 M. WHrrEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 800 (1968).
14. In In re Castioni, [1891] 1 Q.B. 149, which remains the leading case construing the
phrase political offense, Justice Denman stated that it is not "necessary or desirable... to
put into language in the shape of an exhaustive definition exactly the whole state of things,
or every state of things which might bring a particular case within the description of an
offense of a political character." Id. at 155; see also infra notes 39-40 and accompanying
text.
15. Garcia-Mora, The Nature of Political Offenses: A Knotty Problem of Extradition
Law, 48 VA. L. REv. 1226, 1226-27 (1962).
16.
Most extradition laws and treaties provide that extradition need not or shall not be
granted when the acts with which the accused is charged constitute a political
offense or an act connected with a political offense. Generally, a distinction is
drawn between "purely" political offenses.., and "relative" political offenses ....
6 M. WHrrEMAN, supra note 13, at 800; see also Garcia-Mora, supra note 15, at 1230-34,
1239. The distinction between a "pure" and a "relative" political offense is particularly
significant because extradition treaties often grant extradition in terms of "pure" and "rela-
tive" offenses. 6 M. WHITEMAN, supra, at 800.
17. C. VAN DEN WUNGAERT, THE POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION TO EXTRADI-
TION 106 (1980).
18. Cantrell, The Political Offense Exemption in International Extradition: A Compari-
son of the United States, Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland, 60 MARQ. L. Rnv. 777,
780 (1977); see also J. SCHREIBER, THE ULTIMATE WEAPON 153 (1978).
19. Garcia-Mora, The Present Status of Political Offenses in the Law of Extradition and
Asylum, 14 U. Prrr. L. REv. 371, 375 (1953).
20. Id. at 377.
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rorist bombs a crowded department store, injuring customers and
destroying the private premises, the offense is nonetheless political
because its goal was to further a political objective.21
C. UNITED STATES EXTRADITION PROCEDURES AND POLICY
United States extradition law derives from two sources: treaties
and statutes.22 The United States will not extradite an individual to a
requesting state unless it has an extradition treaty with that govern-
ment.23 These treaties, however, are generally silent as to the internal
procedures the signatories will employ to meet their treaty obligations.
In the United States, federal statutes govern extradition proceedings in
the absence of such procedures.24
The United States has developed a two-tiered set of proceedings
to govern its response to extradition requests. Once a request is
received pursuant to a treaty, it is sent to a federal court for determi-
nation.25 By statute, any magistrate or judge in whose jurisdiction the
defendant is found may hold a hearing to consider the sufficiency of
the evidence offered. 26 The magistrate should grant the extradition
21. One commentator defines a relative political offense as one "in which a common
crime is so connected with a political act that the entire offense is regarded as political."
Garcia-Mora, supra note 15, at 1230-31.
22. United States courts have not recognized asylum and extradition as part of custom-
ary international law. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933); United States v.
Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 411-12 (1886); see also 6 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 13, at 732.
23. Valentine v. United States ex reL Neideker, 299 U.S. 5, 10 (1936); Argento v. Horn,
241 F.2d 258 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 818 (1957). This practice reflects concern for
the due process rights of the accused, as well as suspicion of foreign criminal law processes
in general. See Evans, Legal Bases of Extradition in the United States, 16 N.Y. L. F. 525,
526 (1970); see also Lubet & Czackes, The Role of the American Judiciary in the Extradi-
tion of Political Terrorists, 71 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 193, 197-98 (1980); Note, The
New Extradition Treaties of the United States, 59 AM. J. INT'L L. 351 (1965); Note, Ameri-
can Courts and Modern Terrorism: The Politics of Extradition, 13 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 617 (1981) [hereinafter Note, Modern Terrorism].
24. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181-3195 (1984 & Supp. III 1985); see also 1 M. BASSIOuNI, supra
note 9, at § 2-4 to -28.
25. See, ag., Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 513 (7th Cir. 1981).
26. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1984) reads as follows:
Whenever there is a treaty or convention for extradition between the United
States and any foreign government, any justice or judge of the United States, or
any magistrate authorized so to do by a court of the United States, or any judge of
a court of record of general jurisdiction of any State, may, upon complaint made
under oath, charging any person found within his jurisdiction, with having com-
mitted within the jurisdiction of any such foreign government any of the crimes
provided for by such a treaty or convention, issue his warrant for the apprehension
of the person so charged, that he may be brought before such justice, judge, or
magistrate, to the end that the evidence of his criminality may be heard and con-
sidered. If, on such hearing, he deems the evidence sufficient to sustain the charge
under the provisions of the proper treaty or convention, he shall certify the same,
together with a copy of all the testimony taken before him, to the Secretary of
State, that a warrant may issue upon the requisition of the proper authorities of
such foreign government, for the surrender of such person, according to the stipu-
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request if "he deems the evidence sufficient to sustain the charge under
the provisions of the proper treaty or convention. ' 27 Evidence is
deemed sufficient if it would justify commitment for trial had the
offense been committed in the requested state.28 In the United States,
courts apply the probable cause standard in judging the sufficiency of
evidence.29 If the magistrate denies the extradition request, the pro-
cess is formally over.30 A decision by the judiciary to refuse an extra-
dition request is not appealable, either by the executive branch or the
requesting state.31
If a magistrate concludes the evidence is sufficient to justify extra-
dition, however, he certifies the proceedings to the Secretary of State.32
The Secretary of State has discretion to decide whether to extradite in
accordance with the magistrate's decision. 33 Although the final deci-
sion whether to extradite vests exclusively in the executive, 34 the exec-
utive seldom exercises this discretionary power.35
D. THE POLITICAL OFFENSE DOCTRINE UNDER U.S. LAW
A magistrate bases his decision of first instance on the sufficiency
of the evidence in light of the language of the extradition treaty.
Almost every extradition treaty to which the United States is a party
contains a political offense exception. This exception allows each party
to exempt certain acts from extradition because of their political char-
lations of the treaty or convention; and he shall issue his warrant for the commit-
ment of the person so charged to the proper jail, there to remain until such
surrender shall be made.
Id.
27. Id.
28. M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND THE WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
516 (1974).
29. Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167, 175 (2d Cir. 1980) (probable cause standard is
employed in extradition cases); see also Application of D'Amico, 185 F. Supp. 925, 928
(S.D.N.Y. 1960). The probable cause standard requires competent legal evidence leading to
the reasonable conclusion that the accused committed the offense for which he is sought.
Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309 (1922); Coleman v. Burnett, 477 F.2d 1187, 1202 (D.C. Cir.
1973); see also Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174-75 (1949).
30. 2 M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 9, at ch. IX, § 1-3. Although no appeal lies from a
magistrate's decision not to commit the individual for surrender, the extraditee may chal-
lenge the lawfulness of the extradition or the legality of his detention by filing a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1987).
31. Lubet & Czackes, supra note 23, at 199.
32. Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 288 (1902); In re Stupp, 23 F. Cas. 296, 302
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1875) (No. 13563); 18 U.S.C. § 3186 (1948); see also 4 G. HACKWORTH,
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 338 (1942); 1 J. MOORE, A TREATIsE ON EXTRADI-
TION AND INTERSTATE RENDITION § 359 (1891).
33. In re Ezeta, 62 F. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1894); In re Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 927, 930
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1874) (No. 13,887); 18 U.S.C. § 3186 (1958). See generally Note, Executive
Discretion in Extradition, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 1313 (1962).
34. Wacker v. Bisson, 348 F.2d 602, 606 (5th Cir. 1965); see also Sindona v. Grant, 619
F.2d 167, 174 (2d Cir. 1980).
35. See Note, supra note 33, at 1328.
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acter.3 6 By invoking the political offense exception, a magistrate may
deny an extradition request based on an otherwise extraditable offense,
thereby terminating the extradition proceedings.37
Because extradition treaties seldom define the term "political
offense," judicial interpretations are the leading source for its meaning
and application.38 In the seminal case In re Castioni,39 a British court
first articulated a test for determining whether an extraditee's act con-
stituted a political offense. In Castioni, the court refused to extradite a
Swiss citizen who shot a government official because (1) a political
uprising existed at the time and place of the offense, and (2) the offense
committed was incidental to and in furtherance of the uprising.40
A federal district court incorporated this two-pronged political
incidence test into American case law in 1894.41 In subsequent cases,
federal courts have consistently applied this test, defining political
offenses as acts "committed in the course of and incidental to a violent
political disturbance such as war, revolution, or rebellion."' 42 This def-
inition requires a magistrate to determine not only whether the act was
committed to further a political conflict, but also whether a sufficient
political disturbance existed.43 The recent proliferation of political
terrorism, however, has compounded the inherent difficulty of apply-
ing such tests, 44 a difficulty exemplified by four recent and unsettling
36. See supra text accompanying note 13.
37. Lubet & Czackes, supra note 23, at 199.
38. 2 M. BAssIouNI, supra note 9, at §§ 2-6 to -7.
39. [1891] 1 Q.B. 149.
40. Id. at 158-60. The court concluded that Castioni, a member of the uprising group,
committed his acts with a sufficient nexus to the political insurrection as to render his acts
"political" and therefore nonextraditable. Id.
41. In re Ezeta, 62 F. 972, 997 (N.D. Cal. 1894) (alleged acts nonextraditable because
they were incidental to a political uprising and committed during the progress of actual
hostilities).
42. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 518 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981);
see also Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167, 173 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing Garcia-Guillern v.
United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989 (1972));
Jimenez v. Aristequieta, 311 F.2d 547, 560 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 914
(1963).
43. See, e.g., Eain, 641 F.2d at 519. The only statement from the United States
Supreme Court regarding the political offense exception came in Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S.
502 (1896). In Ornelas, the Court interpreted the political offense exception as requiring
the defendant's actions to be not only contemporaneous with the political disturbance, but
also to be in furtherance of a genuine political revolt. Id. at 511. The Court considered the
"character of the foray, the mode of attack, the persons killed or captured, and the kinds of
property taken or destroyed" as important factors in determining whether the defendant's
actions were in aid of a political revolt. Id. at 511-12.
44. For a discussion of modem political terrorism, see generally Note, Modern Terror-
ism, supra note 23, at 632-34. See also Bassiouni, Ideologically Motivated Offenses and the
Political Offenses Exception in Extradition - A Proposed Juridical Standard for an Unruly
Problem, 19 DE PAUL L. REv. 217 (1969).
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judicial decisions.45
E. THE NEED TO REFORM: EXAMPLES FROM CASE LAW
Desmond Mackin, a member of the Provisional Irish Republican
Army (the "PIRA"), was indicted in Northern Ireland on charges of
attempting to murder a British soldier, of wounding that soldier with
intent to do grievous bodily harm, and of possession of firearms and
ammunition.46 Mackin, released on bail, failed to appear for trial and
entered the United States illegally.47 Following Mackin's arrest by the
U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, the United Kingdom
filed a formal extradition request. 48 During his extradition hearing,
Mackin asked the U.S. magistrate to deny this request on the basis of
the political offense exception contained in the United States-United
Kingdom Extradition Treaty.4 9 The magistrate found that Mackin's
acts were "of a political character" within the meaning of the Treaty
and therefore denied the United Kingdom's extradition request.50
Mackin and three other recent cases highlight the inadequacies of
the political-incidence test in the context of terrorism.5 1 In each case,
the British government sought extradition for persons who committed
45. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. _, 107 S. Ct. 271
(1986); In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981); In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); In re McMullen, No. 3-78-1099 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 1979); see infra notes
46-51 and accompanying text.
46. Mackin, 668 F.2d at 124; see also Note, In re Mackin: Is the Application of the
Political Offense Exception an Extradition Issue for the Judicial or the Executive Branch?, 5
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 565, 566-69 (1982).
47. Mackin, 668 F.2d at 124.
48. Id.
49. Article V(1)(c)(i) of the Treaty stated: "(1) Extradition shall not be granted if:
(c)(i) the offense for which extradition is requested is regarded by the requested Party as
one of a political character .... ." Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, Oct. 21, 1976, art. V, para. (1)(c)(i), 28 U.S.T. 227, 230, T.I.A.S.
No. 8468, at 4 [hereinafter Extradition Treaty].
50. Magistrate Buchwald pointed to In re Castioni, [1891] 1 Q.B. 149, for the proposi-
tion that the political offense exception applies not only to pure political offenses, but also
to relative political offenses, i.e., crimes against persons committed in furtherance of revolu-
tion or political uprising. The magistrate found that Mackin's crime was committed
against the soldier incidental to Mackin's role in the PIRA's political uprising in Belfast.
Mackin, 668 F.2d at 124-25.
51. In the first of these cases, In re McMullen, No. 3-78-1099, slip op. at 3 (N.D. Cal.
May 11, 1979), the United Kingdom sought the extradition of a PIRA member for the
alleged bombing of a British Army installation. The court, applying the political incidence
test, found "an insurrection and disruptive uprising of a political nature" did exist at the
time of the alleged bombing. Id. at 4. The court denied the extradition request because the
"bombing was a crime incidental to and formed as a part of a political disturbance, uprising
or insurrection and in furtherance thereof." Id. at 5-6.
In the second case, In re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), the defendant
escaped from a Belfast prison while awaiting a court's decision on charges including the
murder of a British army officer, attempted murder, and possession of firearms with intent
to endanger life. Id. at 272.
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acts of violence in the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland and
subsequently fled to the United States. In each case, a U.S. court
invoked the political offense exception to deny the extradition
request.52
III. THE SUPPLEMENTARY EXTRADITION TREATY
Responding in large measure to Mackin and the three very simi-
lar cases in which federal magistrates denied British extradition
requests for PIRA fugitives,53 the United Kingdom and the United
States recently concluded a Supplementary Treaty on Extradition (the
"Supplementary Treaty" or the "Compromise Treaty"). 54 The Sup-
plementary Treaty significantly altered the political offense exception
In the third case, Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -,
107 S. Ct. 271 (1986), the defendant was charged with murdering a plain-clothes, off-duty
police constable in London, sending letter bombs that caused severe injuries to their recipi-
ents, placing an explosive device in the London area, and conspiring to cause explosions
that were likely to result in the indiscriminate killing of civilians in the London area. Id. at
783-86. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's determina-
tion that Quinn's offenses were protected by the political offense exception. Iad at 782.
52. Two other cases illustrate abuse of the political offense exception respecting extra-
dition requests made by the United States. In In re Holder & Kerkow, the United States
requested of France the extradition of two American citizens indicted in the United States
for their participation in a 1972 aircraft hijacking, kidnapping, and extortion ($500,000
ransom from the airline) episode. A French court denied extradition in 1975 because, at
one point during the skyjacking, one of the air pirates demanded that the plane be flown to
Hanoi. The French court reasoned that his invocation of Hanoi, a demand later dropped,
demonstrated sufficient political motive as to fall within the political offense exception. For
a report of the facts of and the decision in this case, see E. McDOWELL, DIGEST OF
UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 1975, at 168-75 (1985).
In the second case, a French court refused to extradite five U.S. hijackers, who in 1973
had demanded and received $1 million in ransom, because the hijackers claimed they seized
the plane to escape racial segregation and political persecution in the United States.
Although two of the hijackers had escaped from prison, where they had been serving
sentences for murder and armed robbery, the French court nonetheless concluded that the
skyjacking and extortion were political offenses. See Treaty Doc. 99-8, Supplementary
Extradition Treaty Between the United States ofAmerica and the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, With Annex: Hearings on Treaty Doc. 99-8 Before the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 258-60 (1985) [hereinafter Committee
Hearings] (statement of Abraham D. Sofaer, State Department Legal Advisor). But see id.
at 319-21 (statement of Professor Rice, University of Notre Dame Law School).
53. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
54. Supplementary Treaty Concerning the Extradition Treaty Between the Govern-
ment of the United States of America and the Government of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, June 8, 1972, - U.S.T. -, T.I.A.S. No. -, reprinted in S. EXEC. REP. No. 17,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-17 (1986) [hereinafter Supplementary Treaty]. A text of the treaty
as initially submitted to the Senate can be found in TREATY Doc. No. 8, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1-3 (1985) [hereinafter SUBMITTED TREATY]. The Treaty was referred to the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations, which held hearings on August 1, 1985; August 18, 1985; and
October 22, 1985. These hearings are published in bound form in Committee Hearings,
supra note 52. The Senate ratified a compromise version of the Submitted Treaty (the
"Compromise Treaty"), which appears together with the Committee Report in S. EXEC.
REP. No. 17, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) [hereinafter COMMITTEE REPORT].
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contained in the original treaty.55 The Treaty as originally negotiated,
however, met stiff opposition upon submission for Senate ratification.
After considerable debate, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
working in close consultation with the U.S. State Department and the
British Government, amended the Supplementary Treaty and thereaf-
ter adopted a compromise version.56 As Senator Lugar 57 noted during
floor debate, "[w]hile both governments would have preferred that the
Senate approve the treaty as submitted, both are willing to accept the
committee's changes. ' 58
A thorough appreciation of the Supplementary Treaty, then,
requires an examination and comparison of (1) the original United
States-United Kingdom Extradition Treaty (the "Prior Treaty");
(2) the negotiated version of the Supplementary Treaty which was sub-
mitted for Senate ratification (the "Submitted Treaty"); and (3) the
amended Supplementary Treaty which was ratified and is now in force
(the "Compromise Treaty" or the "Supplementary Treaty").
A. THE PRIOR TREATY
The first U.S. extradition agreement was the Jay Treaty of 1794
with the United Kingdom.5 9 "Since then... [the U.K.] has remained
one of our best partners in extradition. '60
The prior United States-United Kingdom Extradition Treaty61
contained a political offense exception similar to corresponding excep-
tions in other extradition treaties. It provided:
Extradition shall not be granted if... (c)(i) the offense for which extradition is
requested is regarded by the requested party as one of a political character; or
(ii) the person sought proves that the request for his extradition has in fact
been made with a view to try or punish him for an offense of a political
character.
62
The Supplementary Treaty as submitted for Senate ratification (the
"Submitted Treaty") substantially altered the preceding language so
that individuals such as Desmond Mackin could no longer find refuge
under the broad political offense exception of the Prior Treaty. 63
55. See infra notes 64-77 and accompanying text.
56. See Supplementary Treaty, supra note 54.
57. Richard P. Lugar (R-Ind.), Chairman of the United States Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations and chief floor spokesman for the Supplementary Extradition Treaty.
58. 132 CONG. REc. S9148 (daily ed. July 16, 1986) [hereinafter July 16 Floor Debate]
(statement of Sen. Lugar).
59. The Jay Treaty included an article for the extradition of murderers and forgers.
Comment, supra note 8, at 146.
60. Committee Hearings, supra note 52, at 7 (testimony of D. Lowell Jensen, Deputy
Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice).
61. Extradition Treaty, supra note 49.
62. See V, paras. notes)64-7 d o y t63. See infra notes 64-77 and accompanying text.
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B. THE SUBMITrED TREATY
The Submitted Treaty amended the political offense exception
contained in the Prior Treaty by use of a broad negative definition of
political offenses and a precise limit on the role of the judiciary in
extradition cases. Article I of the Submitted Treaty identified particu-
lar crimes that could no longer be regarded as political offenses under
the exception. The Submitted Treaty, therefore, would have pre-
cluded U.S. magistrates from invoking the political offense exception
to deny extradition for any act contained in article I of the Treaty.
1. What the Treaty Did
Article I of the Submitted Treaty excluded two categories of acts
from the traditional political offense exception. First, article I
excluded international crimes already the subject of international
criminal law conventions. These conventions cover offenses relating to
the hijacking of aircraft,64 aircraft sabotage,65 crimes against diplo-
mats and other internationally protected persons, 66 and the taking of
hostages.67 The Submitted Treaty, however, was more restrictive than
these various conventions. The conventions allow the requested state
the option of itself prosecuting rather than extraditing. Under the
Submitted Treaty, however, both Great Britain and the United States
obligated themselves to extradite. 68
Second, article I of the Submitted Treaty excluded from the polit-
ical offense exception many relative political offenses.6 9 These offenses
64. Article I(a) excluded from the political offense exception all offenses within the
scope of The Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec.
16, 1970,22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192 (entered into force Oct. 14, 1971). SUBMITTED
TREATY, supra note 54, art. l(a).
65. Article 1(b) excluded from the political offense exception all offenses within the
scope of the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety
of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, T.I.A.S. No. 7570 (entered into force Jan.
26, 1973). SUBMrrrED TREATY, supra note 54, art. l(b).
66. Article l(c) excluded from the political offense exception all offenses within the
scope of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes
Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28
U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532 (entered into force Feb. 20, 1977). SUBMrITED TREATY,
supra note 54, art. l(c).
67. Article l(d) excluded from the political offense exception all offenses within the
scope of the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, 34 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 46) at 245, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/146, (1979). SUBMrTTED TREATY, supra
note 54, art. l(d).
68. See infra note 86. According to Professor Bassiouni, "the formulation of these
exclusions in the [Submitted] Treaty are more restrictive than their counterpart in the rele-
vant conventions because the [Submitted] Treaty obligates unconditionally the parties to
extradition whereas the relevant conventions provide for the alternative right to prosecute
instead of extraditing." Committee Hearings, supra note 52, at 284.
69. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
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included murder,70 manslaughter, 71 inflicting bodily injury, 7 2 and kid-
napping or unlawful detention.73 Article I also removed from the
political offense exception certain offenses involving explosives, 74 vari-
ous acts relating to use or possession of firearms or ammunition,75 and
acts resulting only in property damage but committed with intent to
endanger life or with reckless disregard.76 Article I also excluded an
attempt to commit any of the foregoing offenses from the political
offense exception.77 Thus, the Submitted Treaty would have excluded
all of these ordinary violent crimes from the political offense excep-
tion, even if politically motivated.
2. Rationale for the Submitted Treaty
The Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States
negotiated the Submitted Treaty in an effort to combat terrorism. 78 A
terrorist seeks political change through violent actions. Proponents of
the Submitted Treaty argued that, in a stable democracy, violent
actions must never replace peaceful resort to the political process as a
means for resolving political disputes. The U.S. State Department
Legal Advisor asserted that "[tihe rationale for this new Supplemen-
tary Treaty is simple: with respect to violent crimes, the political
offense exception has no place in extradition treaties between stable
democracies, in which the political system is available to redress legiti-
70. SUBMITTED TREATY, supra note 54, art. l(e).
71. Id. art. l(f).
72. Article l(g) excluded from the political offense exception "maliciously wounding or
inflicting grievous bodily harm." Id. art. l(g).
73. Article 1(h) excluded from the political offense exception "kidnapping, abduction,
false imprisonment or unlawful detention, including the taking of a hostage." Id. art. 1(h).
74. Article 1(i) excluded from the political offense exception "the following offenses
relating to explosives: (1) the causing of an explosion likely to endanger life or cause seri-
ous damage to property; or (2) conspiracy to cause such an explosion; or (3) the making of
an explosive substance by a person who intends either himself or through another person to
endanger life or cause serious damage to property." Id. art. l(i).
75. Article 10) excluded from the political offense exception "the following offenses
relating to firearms or ammunition: (1) the possession of a firearm or ammunition by a
person who intends either himself or through another person to endanger life; or (2) the use
of a firearm by a person with intent to resist or prevent the arrest or detention of himself or
another person." Id. art. 1(j).
76. Article l(k) excluded from the political offense exception crimes involving "damag-
ing property with intent to endanger life or with reckless disregard as to whether the life of
another would thereby be endangered." Id art. l(k).
77. Article 1(1) excluded from the political offense exception "an attempt to commit
any of the foregoing offenses." Id art. 1(1).
78. According to President Reagan, the Submitted Treaty "represents a significant step
in improving law enforcement cooperation and combatting terrorism, by excluding from
the scope of the political offense exception serious offenses typically committed by terrorists
... ." Letter from Ronald Reagan to the Senate of the United States (July 17, 1985) (letter
of transmittal of the Supplementary Treaty), reprinted in SUBMITED TREATY, supra note
54, at III.
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mate grievances and the judicial process provides fair treatment. '79
Thus, the all-inclusive language of the Submitted Treaty's negative
definition of "political" offense excluded from the political offense
exception all violent acts committed in the United Kingdom or the
United States.
C. THE COMPROMISE TREATY
The Supplementary Treaty as submitted aroused immediate, vig-
orous, and lengthy public debate.80 Indeed, the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee characterized the Submitted Treaty as "one of the
most divisive and contentious issues the committee has faced this Con-
gress." 81 While opposition kept the Submitted Treaty stalled in com-
79. Committee Hearings, supra note 52, at 265 (statement of Abraham D. Sofaer, State
Department Legal Adviser).
80. The New York Times, for example, supported the Treaty as submitted: "The right
of asylum is not jeopardized when democratic countries with similar legal systems agree to
extradite all those accused of violent offenses-without 'political' exceptions. An old and
generous impulse is mocked when the lawless can play one nation's laws against another's."
Sealing a Terrorist Foxhole, N.Y. Times, July 11, 1985, at A22, col. 1 (editorial). In
response, however, one Treaty opponent stated, "I believe the editorial in The New York
Times... was prior to the submission of the treaty and the language was not yet clear, nor
the manner in which it would be set forth ... so I am not sure whether or not that is their
current position." Stenographic Transcript, United States-United Kingdom Supplementary
Extradition Treaty, Treaty Doc. 99-& Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Rela-
tions, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 104-05 (1985) (statement of Sen. Kerry).
The Supplementary Treaty also caused a heated debate, centering on violence in North-
ern Ireland, before the American Bar Association's 47th annual midyear convention in
Baltimore. See Extradition, Visa Issues Top ABA Agenda, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 10, 1986, at 3,
col. 1. Judge Abner J. Mikva, chairman of the ABA's Section on Individual Rights and
Responsibilities, said he had received a "boxful of mail" objecting to endorsement of the
Treaty. Id. at 8, col. 2. The ABA ultimately decided to support the Treaty, but only after
a rare, direct appeal to the ABA House of Delegates by State Department Legal Adviser
Abraham D. Sofaer. Political Stakes Raised at ABA Meeting, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 24, 1986, at
3, col. 1. Regarding the ABA delegates, Abraham Sofaer, a former federal judge, later
stated, "[t]hey were totally uninformed - the people who were speaking against this ....
They weren't interested in being informed. Many of them were just emotionally connecting
the treaty with the Irish cause." Id at 36, col. 1.
81. COMMrrrEE REPORT, supra note 54, at 6. According to Senator D'Amato, "[tihe
supplementary treaty emasculates the political offense exception, which the United States
has historically used as a cornerstone of its extradition policy." July 16 Floor Debate,
supra note 58, at S9153. Arguing that "[i]f this treaty had been in effect in 1776, or even
after the Treaty of Paris in 1783, this language would have labeled the boys who fought at
Lexington and Concord as terrorists," Senator Helms objected to the treaty on the grounds
that "[o]nce the legal distinction has been abolished between terrorists and freedom fight-
ers, it will be very difficult to sustain support for the Afghan Mujahideen, Savimbi's
UNITA fighters, the Nicaraguan resistance, the Cambodian resistance, or any other group
fighting against an established tyranny." Id. at 59161. The American Civil Liberties
Union opposed the treaty, citing "the very important question of whether this nation will
abandon its two hundred year old tradition of refusing to return unsuccessful revolution-
aries to their homeland to suffer victor's justice." Committee Hearings, supra note 52, at
411 (statement of Morton H. Halperin). In part to allay such concerns, the Senate included
in its Resolution of Ratification a declaration that
[t]he Senate of the United States declares that it will not give its advice and consent
to any treaty that would narrow the political offense exception with a totalitarian
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mittee, extraneous political considerations, inter alia, gave the treaty
new momentum and prompted pro-treaty senators to propose a modi-
fied Supplementary Treaty.82 The new version (the "Compromise
Treaty" or the "Supplementary Treaty") attempted to ameliorate con-
cerns regarding the due process rights of individuals while preserving
the Submitted Treaty's antiterrorism goals. The Compromise Treaty
proved acceptable to both parties and ultimately was ratified.8 3
The Compromise Treaty reflects a concern that, under the Sub-
mitted Treaty, the broad negative definition of political offense, cou-
pled with a circumscribed role for the judiciary in applicable cases,
would sacrifice individual justice to broader foreign policy issues.84
The Compromise Treaty, therefore, pairs a modified negative defini-
tion of political offense with an affirmative role for U.S. courts.
Article I of the Compromise Treaty excludes from the political
offense exception a narrower list of violent crimes than did the Submit-
ted Treaty.85 Like the Submitted Treaty, the Compromise Treaty
excludes those offenses for which multilateral international agreements
or other non-democratic regime and that nothing in the Supplementary Treaty
with the United Kingdom shall be considered a precedent by the executive branch
or the Senate for other treaties.
COMMIrrEE REPORT, supra note 54, at 10. For a collection of newspaper stories and
editorials capturing the general flavor of the public debate, see Committee Hearings, supra
note 52, at 874-911.
82. In April 1986, the British government permitted American planes to take off from
bases in England on a bombing mission against Libya. France refused permission for those
same planes to fly over French airspace. The New York Times reported, "the explicit link
with the Libyan situation has given the treaty a new momentum." N.Y. Times, Apr. 30,
1986, at B6, col. 3. According to the Wall Street Journal,
the British government of Margaret Thatcher-which permitted the U.S. to use F-
11 Is based in Britain to attack Libya and worked at the Tokyo summit to assure a
tough statement on terrorism-is stepping up its own efforts [to assure Senate rati-
fication]. The British, in fact, describe the extradition treaty as a test of U.S.
resolve against terrorism.
Wall St. J., May 12, 1986, at 52, col. 1. In an editorial entitled "Reciprocity in Washing-
ton," the London Times wrote:
The British government took upon itself political opprobrium last week by its
approval of the use of American bases in Britain for the Libyan strikes. It
offended, the polls said, a wide swathe of British public opinion. Is it not time for
the government of the United States to pay a debt?
The London Times, April 22, 1986, reprinted in Committee Hearings, supra note 52, at 883.
The editorial concluded with a blunt message to the United States Senate: "You owe us
one." Id. The message apparently got through. According to one senator, for example,
"Prime Minister Thatcher... has been a true ally during some very difficult times, not the
least of which was allowing our planes the accommodation that made possible our strike
against terrorism in Libya. July 16 Floor Debate, supra note 58, at S9155 (statement of
Sen. D'Amato). Another senator remarked, "[w]e bombed ... Tripoli to show our revul-
sion for acts of terrorism committed against us ... [y]et, when terrorism is committed
against other people, the British, for example, we are supposed to treat the terrorist with
jurisprudential favor." Id at S9252 (statement of Sen. Eagleton).
83. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 54, at 3.
84. July 16 Floor Debate, supra note 58, at 59148.
85. The Compromise Treaty contains two substantive clauses in addition to article I.
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oblige extradition,8 6 as well as murder and voluntary manslaughter, 87
assault causing grievous bodily harm,88 and kidnapping, abduction, or
serious unlawful detention (including taking a hostage).8 9 The Com-
promise Treaty, however, generalizes language relating to explosives
and firearms or ammunition that was specific and precise under the
submitted version 90 In addition, the Compromise Treaty deletes all
references in the Submitted Treaty to property damage, possession,
intent, and conspiracy.91
In addition to modifying the Submitted Treaty's negative defini-
tion of political offense, the Compromise Treaty adds an affirmative
role for U.S. courts in applicable extradition cases. Article III of the
Compromise Treaty allows an individual wanted for an article I
offense the opportunity to establish in court that he is being sought,
not for his alleged crime, but because of his race, religion, nationality,
or political opinions.92 Alternatively, the individual sought has the
opportunity to establish that, if surrendered, he would be prejudiced
or punished because of these factors.93 "If he can prove either by a
Article IV amends the Prior Treaty to provide that the requesting state shall have up to
60 days following the provisional arrest of a fugitive to submit evidence in support of its
extradition request. The Prior Treaty allowed only 40 days for submission of such
evidence.
Under article V, the Compromise Treaty applies to any offense committed before or after
the Treaty's entry into force. The United States has entered into supplementary extradition
treaties with over 20 nations, and virtually every one was made retroactive to the date of
entry into force of the original treaty. Additionally, courts have consistently upheld the
retroactive application of extradition treaties. See, eg., In re Burt, 737 F.2d 1477 (7th Cir.
1984).
86. Article l(a) states that "[flor the purposes of the Extradition Treaty, none of the
following shall be regarded as an offense of a political character: (a) an offense for which
both Contracting Parties have the obligation pursuant to a multilateral international agree-
ment to extradite the person sought or to submit his case to their competent authorities for
decision as to prosecution." Supplementary Treaty, supra note 54, art. l(a).
87. Id. art. l(b). The Committee Report also includes a section-by-section comparison
of the Submitted treaty with the Compromise treaty. COMMrrTEE REPORT, supra note 54,
at 6-9.
88. Supplementary Treaty, supra note 54, art. l(b).
89. Id. art. 1(c).
90. Id. art. l(d).
91. See COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 54, at 4.
92. Article 3(b), with reference to section 3(a), states that "the competent judicial
authority shall only consider the defense to extradition set forth in paragraph (a) for
defenses listed in article I of this Supplementary Treaty." Supplementary Treaty, supra
note 54, art. 3(b).
93. Article 3(a) states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Supplementary Treaty, extradition
shall not occur if the person sought establishes to the satisfaction of the competent
judicial authority by a preponderance of the evidence that the request for extradi-
tion has in fact been made with a view to try or punish him on account of his race,
religion, nationality, or political opinions, or that he would, if surrendered, be
prejudiced at his trial or punished, detained or restricted in his personal liberty by
reason of his race, religion, nationality, or political opinions.
Id. art. 3(a); see also infra note 142.
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preponderance of the evidence, he can defeat the extradition
request."'94
The Senate further modified the Submitted Treaty by adding arti-
cle II, which addresses the procedures governing consideration of an
extradition request in U.S. courts. Article II states that a person
sought for extradition under the Supplementary Treaty may introduce
evidence in a court regarding probable cause. 95
IV. ANALYSIS
As ultimately enacted, the Supplementary Treaty represents an
admirable effort to combat terrorism. The Supplementary Treaty is
both extraordinary and commendable for its limitation on the political
offense exception to extradition. By shifting judicial discretion to the
executive, however, the Treaty as originally submitted would have
more effectively eliminated the terrorist loophole which has plagued
extradition relations between the United States and the United
Kingdom.96
A. UNDERLYING POLICY DETERMINATIONS
Three important policy determinations underlie the U.S. decision
to conclude the Supplementary Treaty. First, the Treaty represents a
94. July 16 Floor Debate, supra note 58, at S9148 (statement of Sen. Lugar).
95. Article 2 states:
Nothing in this Supplementary Treaty shall be interpreted as imposing the obli-
gation to extradite if the judicial authority of the requested Party determines that
the evidence of criminality presented is not sufficient to sustain the charge under
the provisions of the treaty. The evidence of criminality must be such as, accord-
ing to the law of the requested Party, would justify committal for trial if the offense
had been committed in the territory of the requested Party.
In determining whether an individual is extraditable from the United States, the
judicial authority of the United States shall permit the individual sought to present
evidence on the questions of whether:
(1) there is probable cause;
(2) a defense to extradition specified in the Extradition Treaty or this Supplemen-
tary Treaty, and within the jurisdiction of the courts, exists; and
(3) the act upon which the request for extradition is based would constitute an
offense punishable under the laws of the United States.
Probable cause means whether there is sufficient evidence to warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief that:
(1) the person arrested or summoned to appear is the person sought;
(2) in the case of a person accused of having committed a crime, an offense has
been committed by the accused; and
(3) in the case of a person alleged to have been convicted of an offense, a certifi-
cate of conviction or other evidence of conviction or criminality exists.
Supplementary Treaty, supra note 54, art. 2.
96. This Note acknowledges, but does not discuss, certain separation of powers con-
cerns, along with constitutional issues relating to the President's article II power "to make
treaties," in light of the Senate's major overhaul of the submitted version of the Supplemen-
tary Treaty.
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recognition of the need to narrow the scope of the political offense
exception. Second, the Supplementary Treaty reflects the U.S. deci-
sion to limit the political offense exception on a country-by-country
basis, rather than seek to amend the federal extradition statute appli-
cable to all U.S. extradition treaties. Third, with the Supplementary
Treaty the United States has chosen to initiate this country-by-country
approach with the United Kingdom.
L Narrowing the Political Offense Exception
By narrowing the political offense exception to include only
purely political and non-violent crimes, 97 the Submitted Treaty would
have significantly decreased the possibility of denying extradition for
any violent act.98 One expert characterized the Submitted Treaty's
article I exclusions as follows: "These exclusions unconditionally
remove the enumerated acts of violence from the 'political offense'
exception, irrespective of their nature, intensity, the harm they pro-
duced, the motives and goals of the actor, [or] the circumstances that
may have compelled the actor to commit such acts." 99
The Submitted Treaty's restriction of the political offense excep-
tion reflected the confidence the United Kingdom and the United
States have in each other's political and judicial systems. 100 Unfortu-
nately, the Compromise Treaty softens the Submitted Treaty's sharp
restriction of the political offense exception. Nevertheless, the Treaty
as enacted still evidences an understanding of the need to narrow the
scope of the exception as between the United States and the United
Kingdom.
2. Country-by-Country Approach to Making Treaties
The United States only maintains extradition relations with
nations with which it has made extradition treaties. 10' Most of these
extradition treaties possess political offense exception clauses phrased
in general language. 0 2 By supplanting this general language with an
explicit limitation of the political offense exception, the Compromise
Treaty grants one country special, albeit reciprocal, treatment respect-
97. See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
98. Committee Hearings, supra note 52, at 292 (statement of M.C. Bassiouni).
99. Id.
100. According to State Department Legal Adviser Abraham D. Sofaer, the Supplemen-
tary Treaty strikes the right balance precisely because "it narrows the political offense
exception as applied to United Kingdom requests to pure political and non-violent crimes."
Id. at 4. The Treaty "reflects the basic principle that terrorist violence should not be toler-
ated against stable democracies in which the political process is available to redress legiti-
mate grievances and in which the judicial system provides fair treatment." Id.
101. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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ing the political offense exception. 10 3 Some Supplementary Treaty
opponents argue that narrowing the political offense exception
through individual treaties wrongly implies special relationships with
some nations to the exclusion of others. 104 The United States, how-
ever, obviously has special relationships with some nations, such as its
allies. More fundamentally, it would be inappropriate to apply the
Supplementary Treaty's narrower political offense exception to all
countries with which the United States maintains extradition relations.
A narrower exemption is appropriate only for those countries in which
the freedom and fairness of the political system is beyond doubt. 105
Certainly this is not the case in all nations with which the United
States maintains extradition treaties.10 6
3. Starting with the United Kingdom
Accepting a country-by-country approach to limiting the political
offense exception, the merit of initiating the approach with the United
Kingdom is clear. 10 7 By narrowing the political offense exception to
103. A country-by-country approach, however, ought not on its face receive a suspect
glance. According to one commentator:
It does not follow... that each of these [extradition] treaties should or must be
identical. Considering the nature of the particular regime and its relationship to
the United States, we might well want to negotiate either a broad or a restrictive
extradition treaty as circumstances warrant. For example, our relationship with
Canada no doubt calls for the maximum level of cooperation, while we would obvi-
ously not choose to be as forthcoming with Poland, Albania, or South Africa. If
we were required to treat every nation in the same manner that we regard our
closest allies and neighbors, we would no doubt have to curtail drastically our
number of treaty partners, thereby defeating the goal of maximum extraditability.
Committee Hearings, supra note 52, at 396 (statement of Steven Lubet).
104. See, eg., id at 302 (statement of M.C. Bassiouni).
105. This point received particular attention in an exchange between Senator Dodd and
State Department Legal Adviser Sofaer during a hearing before the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee:
Senator Dodd: Would you like to see this kind of treaty adopted as a boiler-plate
language for all extradition treaties around the globe?
Judge Sofaer: Absolutely not.
Senator Dodd: Why not?
Judge Sofaer: Because there are nations with whom [sic] we will not make this
kind of treaty.
Senator Dodd: Why not?
Judge Sofaer: First of all, most significantly, there are nations where there is no
open system of political opposition and dissent. Second of all is
where the system of justice is fundamentally unfair. We would
not make this kind of treaty with those nations.
Id. at 20.
106. See, e.g., Treaty on Extradition Between the United States and the Union of South
Africa, Dec. 18, 1947, 2 U.S.T. 884, T.I.A.S. No. 2243.
107. According to the State Department, the United States is considering similar treaties
with other nations. "However, a threshold issue will be - and has been in our negotiations
to date - whether the country allows free expression of views, including unpopular or dis-
senting views." Committee Hearings, supra note 52, at 707 (State Department response to
questions posed by Foreign Relations Committee staff).
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exclude all politically-motivated violent crimes, the Supplementary
Treaty obligates both parties to extradite persons accused or convicted
of such crimes. United States opponents of the Supplementary Treaty
resisted creation of such an unconditional obligation, largely because
of the continuing conflict within Northern Ireland relating to its polit-
ical status within the United Kingdom. 0 8 The PIRA 10 9 continues to
use violent means to attack the British presence in Northern Ireland.
The United Kingdom has responded through the promulgation of spe-
cial criminal procedures to combat this violence." 0
Although the debate on the political status of Northern Ireland
remains divisive, the Supplementary Treaty does not necessarily sup-
port one side over the other."' Certainly, the Supplementary Treaty
seeks to prevent the political offense exception from providing refuge
for violent criminals. To that extent, PIRA members will no longer be
able to invoke the exception. Apart from the PIRA, however, those
groups most strongly resisting a British presence in Northern Ireland
have renounced violence as a vehicle for political change. Recent gov-
ernments of the Republic of Ireland, like many who strongly support
Irish sovereignty in Northern Ireland, have denounced the PIRA's
violent offenses against British forces and civilians.'12 The Supplemen-
tary Treaty is unobjectionable, therefore, for its target is violence, not
ideology.
B. THE BASES OF CONTROVERSY
The Supplementary Treaty nonetheless prompts three legitimate
concerns. First, the limitation on the political offense exception
resembles prior congressional attempts to legislate such a limitation.
Some favor legislation over a treaty-based approach. Second, the fair-
ness of the United Kingdom's administration of Northern Ireland
comes into question. Finally, the broad sweep of the Supplementary
108. For one view of the historical background of this controversy, see O'Brien, Irish
Terrorists and Extradition: The Tuite Case, 18 TEx. INT'L L.J. 249, 249-60 (1983).
109. The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) is the ideological successor to the
Irish Republican Army (IRA). V ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 427 (15th ed. 1983).
110. See infra notes 122-27 and accompanying text.
111. Some Supplementary Treaty opponents label the acts enumerated in article I as the
"IRA Exclusions." See, e.g., Committee Hearings, supra note 52, at 290 (statement of
M.C. Bassiouni).
112. For example, Sean MacBride, former Foreign Minister of the Republic of Ireland,
has said:
I am not in favour of the use of physical force, or the activities of the different
paramilitary groups. I do not think they are justified, and I think that Partition
could be ended by political means provided our political parties made the neces-
sary effort.
Id. at 325 (address to the Irish-American Unity Conference, January 16, 1984).
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Treaty's exclusions raises certain concerns even after the Compromise
Treaty curtailed these exclusions.
L Treaty Approach Versus Legislation
The outdated system of international extradition, coupled with
the recent proliferation of terrorist activity, has resulted in wholly
unsatisfactory cases of terrorists escaping extradition. 1 3 Recognizing
that "[t]he contemporary international environment requires an extra-
dition law that reduces the ability of terrorists to claim the protection
of the political offense exception, but which retains the vitality of the
concept of political asylum for legitimate dissidents,"' 4 Congress
attempted to reform U.S. extradition laws in the early 1980s."15 Con-
gress' treatment of the political offense exception, with one important
difference, closely resembled that of the Supplementary Treaty." 6
Some members of Congress sought to define political offenses by
exclusion."17 The exclusions included codification of existing interna-
tional conventions dealing with aircraft hijacking and sabotage, hos-
tage taking, and attacks on diplomats. Additional exclusions covered
offenses relating to firearm use, homicide, assault with intent to com-
mit serious bodily injury, kidnapping, and unlawful detention. How-
ever, where the Supplementary Treaty states that "none of the
following" constitute political offenses, legislative definitions adopted
language stating that the political offense exception "normally" or
"except in extraordinary circumstances" excludes the enumerated
acts. 1 8 This difference in language reflects the reluctance of the
United States to bind itself unconditionally to all nations with which it
maintains extradition treaties.' 19
113. See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
114. Lubet, Extradition Reform: Executive Discretion and Judicial Participation in the
Extradition of Political Terrorists, 15 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 247, 248 (1982).
115. See Bassiouni, Extradition Reform Legislation in the United States: 1981-1983, 17
AKRON L. REV. 495 (1984).
116. Lubet, supra note 114, at 248.
117. For a discussion of the exclusion approach in recent legislation, see id. at 267-89;
Note, supra note 10, at 165-67; Note, Extradition Reform and the Statutory Definition of
Political Offenses, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 419, 447-48 (1984) [hereinafter Note, Statutory
Definition].
118. For example, S. 220, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. § 3194 (1983) contained the "except in
extraordinary circumstances" language. See Note, Statutory Definition, supra note 117, at
446-52.
119. Legislation containing the "extraordinary circumstances" language, reported by
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1982 and again in 1983, was of general applica-
tion. Since that legislation would have applied to every nation with which the United
States maintained extradition relations, the phrase was added as a precaution on the theory
that
it should also not be the policy of the United States to render up automatically to
foreign authorities an individual who, in the course of seeking to exercise legitimate
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Because any legislative narrowing of the political offense defini-
tion must apply to every country with which the United States main-
tains an extradition treaty, any legislative enactment will inevitably
suffer from one of two fatal infirmities. On the one hand, if Congress
seeks a set of exclusions applicable to all countries, the new political
offense definition will be so conditional as to render it virtually useless.
On the other hand, if Congress seeks a meaningful set of exclusions,
such exclusions would be appropriate only for those U.S. extradition
partners whose free and fair political and judicial systems guarantee
due process to the accused. 120 The efficacy of the Supplementary
Treaty, therefore, stems from its narrow definition of the political
offense exception, a definition which applies only to extradition rela-
tions between the United States and the United Kingdom, a country
whose due process safeguards meet the requisite standard.
2. Is the Regime Democratic and Fair?
A second important controversy concerns the continuing conflict
within Northern Ireland. The Supplementary Treaty requires extradi-
tion for virtually all violent crimes. A decision to extradite, however,
presupposes that the requesting state possesses a fair system of justice.
On this basis, some critics have opposed the Supplementary Treaty
because of British judicial organs operating in Northern Ireland.
In the early 1970s, in an effort to control escalating violence in
Northern Ireland, the British government altered ordinary criminal
justice procedures for terrorists. 121 Such reforms resulted in what are
known today as the "Diplock Courts."' 22 The Diplock Courts differ
civil or political rights in a non-violent manner, is placed in such a position that he
has no reasonable choice except to commit an otherwise criminal act.
S. RFP. No. 475, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1981). According to the State Department, how-
ever, "[t]his Supplementary Treaty is with a specific country-a country which guarantees
the legitimate exercise of civil and political rights, and which affords a fundamentally fair
judicial system. The caution which the 'extraordinary circumstances' provision embodies is
not applicable to the United Kingdom." Committee Hearings, supra note 52, at 709 (State
Department response to questions posed by Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff).
120. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
121. Ordinary resistance escalated into severe rioting and violence in Belfast in 1969.
On August 14, 1969, Parliament sent the British Army into Northern Ireland. PIRA ter-
rorism intensified, and the British Army began a system of internment without trial,
regarded by the Governments of Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom as a tempo-
rary measure aimed at breaking the PIRA's influence. Parliament subsequently enacted
legislation providing for special judicial procedures for the severe political commotion in
Northern Ireland. See State Department Report to the United States Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee Regarding the "Diplock Courts," reprinted in Committee Hearings, supra
note 52, at 550 [hereinafter State Department Report] (report prepared in response to Sena-
tor Dodd's request for an analysis of the Diplock Court system).
122. The administration of justice in Northern Ireland became the focus of the "Com-
mission on Legal Procedures to Deal with Terrorist Activity in Northern Ireland," chaired
by Lord Diplock. Id.
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most significantly from Northern Ireland's ordinary criminal courts in
that defendants are tried before a single judge, not a jury.123 This
reflects the fear that jurors might be intimidated or killed by
terrorists. 124
Although trial by jury is an integral part of the Anglo-Saxon legal
heritage, the Diplock Court system is not inconsistent with the neces-
sary procedural safeguards contemplated by the Supplementary
Treaty. 125 Numerous protections buttress the system. Defendants in
Diplock Courts have an absolute right to counsel, both at trial and in
the police station before indictment. The prosecution bears the burden
of proof, and all defendants have a right to confront hostile witnesses
at trial. Judges in Diplock courts must also state the reasons for their
decisions, and both decisions of fact and of law are subject to
appeal. 126 According to the U.S. State Department, "[a]cquittal rates
in Diplock courts are very similar to those in the jury courts of North-
ern Ireland; indeed in 1983 the rate for Diplock courts was higher." 127
123. This and other recommendations contained in The Diplock Commission's Report
were adopted through Parliament's enactment of the 1973 Emergency Provisions Act. The
Act sets forth a schedule of common law offenses prosecuted in a manner different from
normal criminal law procedures. Id at 551.
124. According to former Prime Minister of Ireland Garrett Fitzgerald, "[w]e do not
have trial by jury in our country for terrorist crimes. That has not been possible in any part
of Ireland for over ten years because trial by jury means that the jurors' lives are
threatened, and, in the past, jurors and their families have been murdered." See Committee
Hearings, supra note 52, at 13; see also State Department Report, supra note 121, at 557.
The Report states that the reason for "trying terrorist cases before a judge alone is Lord
Diplock's observation that the jury system was in danger of a complete breakdown in
Northern Ireland. Terrorists were engaging in actual intimidation of juries, and there was
widespread fear of retaliation for 'bad' jury verdicts." Id.
125. Indeed, even inIn re Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), where the United
Kingdom's extradition request was denied on the basis of the political offense exception,
Judge Sprizzo concluded that British authorities in Northern Ireland possessed the capac-
ity to justly try an alleged PIRA gunman:
The Court also specifically rejects [Doherty's] claim that the Diplock Courts and
the procedures there employed are unfair, and that [Doherty] did not get a fair
trial and cannot get a fair trial in the courts of Northern Ireland. The Court finds
the testimony of the Government witnesses as to this issue both credible and per-
suasive. The Court concludes that both Unionists and Republicans who commit
offenses of a political character can and do receive fair and impartial justice and
that the courts of Northern Ireland will continue to scrupulously and courageously
discharge their responsibilities in that regard.
Id. at 276. In addition, according to the State Department Legal Advisor, "[t]he Diplock
Courts afford defendants the essential components of procedural fairness: open trials, wit-
nesses may be called and cross-examined, the prosecution has the burden of proving guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant has the right to legal counsel and an absolute
right to [ap]peal." Committee Hearings, supra note 52, at 5 (statement by Abraham D.
Sofaer).
126. State Department Report, supra note 121, at 550-61.
127. Id. at 558.
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3. Is the Treaty's Sweep Too Broad?
A third controversial feature of the Supplementary Treaty is the
broad sweep of the article I exclusions. The Supplementary Treaty
narrows extradition law's political offense exception to include only
purely political and non-violent crimes. Critics contend that the Sup-
plementary Treaty's exclusions, so broad as to embrace most relative
political offenses, risk binding U.S. courts in a manner likely to pro-
duce unjust results. 128
When the treaty was first submitted for Senate ratification, it was
suggested that the article I exclusions be altered to allow courts more
discretion in applying the Supplementary Treaty.129 For example,
deletion of offenses such as possession of firearms or damaging prop-
erty130 would have no effect on those exclusions aimed at offenses such
as murder or kidnapping,1 31 but would decrease the chance that a U.S.
court would be bound to grant extradition for an offense committed
under "questionable" circumstances. Another suggested change
would have limited the applicability of the article I exclusions to only
those relative political offenses directed against non-soldiers or persons
who are not government agents.13 2 A third suggestion would have
made article I's exclusions applicable "in all but extraordinary circum-
stances" or merely "normally." 1 33
The Senate obviously saw merit in some limitation on the Submit-
ted Treaty's broad negative definition of the political offense excep-
tion. In its compromise version, the Senate narrowed the sweep of the
negative definition by deleting references to, inter alia, property dam-
age, possession, intent, and conspiracy. As ultimately ratified, there-
fore, the Supplementary Treaty's negative definition of the political
offense exception represents a compromise between the expansive
sweep of the Submitted Treaty, and the alternative extreme of the
Prior Treaty, which had provided a loophole for PIRA terrorists.
The merit of both the suggested and adopted limitations on the
Submitted Treaty's broad negative definition increases in direct pro-
portion to the unfairness of the political system to which the Supple-
mentary Treaty applies. For example, if the United States concludes
128. See, e.g., Committee Hearings, supra note 52, at 308, 323 (testimony of Professor
Charles E. Rice, University of Notre Dame Law School).
129. Id. at 66 (statement of Senator De Concini).
130. See supra notes 75-76.
131. See supra notes 70, 73 and accompanying text.
132. Indeed, Professor Pyle, testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
in opposition to the Supplementary Treaty, stated: "I cannot extend my concern with that
kind of killing to people who shoot at soldiers, because I remember that Americans also
shot at British soldiers, and shot in a kind of 'cowardly' fashion, from behind farmhouses
and stone walls. . . ." Committee Hearings, supra note 52, at 97.
133. Id. at 76 (testimony of Congressman Hughes).
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such an extradition treaty with a country not possessing a free and fair
political and judicial system, or a recent democracy with questionable
stability, then some limitation on the scope of the article I exclusions
would be appropriate.
Clearly, the Compromise Treaty is better than no treaty at all.
The Submitted Treaty, however, stood for the proposition that vio-
lence is never an acceptable means toward political ends in a stable
democracy. As former Secretary of State William P. Rogers told the
United Nations General Assembly: "Political passion, however
deeply held, cannot be a justification for criminal violence against
innocent persons. Certainly... terrorist acts.., are totally unaccept-
able attacks against the very fabric of international order. They must
be universally condemned, whether we consider the cause the ter-
rorists invoke noble or ignoble, legitimate or illegitimate." 134 The
sweeping article I exclusions in the Submitted Treaty effectuated that
policy. Although the Compromise Treaty narrows the political
offense exception to some degree, the original version as concluded
between the British and American governments unambiguously
affirmed that both countries are stable democracies possessing fair
political and judicial systems. The Compromise Treaty, with its nar-
rower negative definition of the political offense exception, undermines
the goal of unfettered extradition.
4. Shifting Judicial Discretion to the Executive
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the Submitted Treaty
was its shift of judicial discretion to the executive. 135 Under the prior
extradition treaty between the United Kingdom and the United States,
the judiciary made extradition decisions on a case-by-case basis. Typi-
cally, after the United Kingdom would make an extradition request,
the extraditee would seek a denial of that request on the basis of the
political offense exception. The U.S. magistrate would then decide
whether the act in question fell within the political offense exception.
If the magistrate found the exception controlling, the magistrate
would deny the extradition request and terminate the proceedings.1 36
The Submitted Treaty would have significantly limited judicial
discretion regarding invocation of the political offense exception.
When confronted by any relative political offense, the magistrate
would no longer have decided on a case-by-case basis whether that act
was incidental to or in furtherance of some political goal. All such
134. Rogers, A World Free of Violence, 67 DEP'T ST. BULL. 425, 429 (1972).
135. See Note, Political Offenses in Extradition: Time for Judicial Abstention, 5 HAS-
TINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 131 (1981).
136. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
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acts would have been prospectively excluded from the political offense
exception.
Whenever the Submitted Treaty precluded a magistrate from
denying an extradition request, the magistrate would then certify the
request to the Secretary of State. At that point, the Secretary of State
would examine any peculiar circumstances of the case and retain exec-
utive discretion to deny the extradition request. 137 Thus, the Submit-
ted Treaty shifted any discretion attached to the political offense
exception from the judiciary to the executive. 138 Since extradition
decisions in the United States have traditionally been made by the
judicial branch, this shift would have been a significant reform.
Because of fear that "taking the political offense exception away
from the courts left the executive branch with the sole discretion to
determine whether to extradite when political issues were involved,"
the Senate added articles II and 111139 to the Compromise Treaty.' 40
Article II adds nothing new to U.S. extradition law, but merely makes
clear the right of the person accused to introduce evidence on the
question of probable cause.' 41 Article III, however, clearly exists in
the Compromise Treaty to address the Senate's concern. Article III
restores broad discretionary power to the courts. For example, it
establishes an affirmative right of inquiry by U.S. courts into the
administration of justice in Northern Ireland with respect to the indi-
vidual sought. A U.S. court must deny extradition where the person
137. The magistrate in Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1, p. 54 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 1981)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file), argued that one reason the judiciary should decide
such cases is that courts would not embarrass the executive or U.S. foreign policy in apply-
ing the political offense exception, since "in rendering such determinations the Courts are
not being called upon to make delicate foreign policy decisions, to debate the political cli-
mate in a certain country, or to pass judgment on the merits or demerits of the political
affairs of another nation." Id. Yet, this is precisely what courts do in applying the political
offense exception. The Mackin court itself engaged in a lengthy discussion of "the political
crisis" in Northern Ireland, including examination of "the historical conflict" and "the
years 1969 to date." Id. The magistrate concluded that "when viewed in the context of a
continuous uprising spanning at least a decade, with historical antecedents, the level of
violence in... Northern Ireland in March 1978 was of sufficient severity and in the nature
of the political uprising as contemplated by In re Castioni ... ." Id. It may be that a
politically-motivated determination will prove less embarrassing to the U.S. government if
made by the independent judiciary, rather than the foreign policy-making executive. This
depends, however, on whether foreign anger will focus on the single branch that made the
decision in Mackin, or on the U.S. government as a whole.
138. In some respects, this purported shift of judicial discretion to the executive is illu-
sory. Under the Prior Treaty, the executive and the judiciary shared concurrent authority
to determine whether the accused committed a political crime. Under the Submitted
Treaty, the executive would have gained no new authority in such cases. However, because
the judiciary would have lost much of its discretion through the Submitted Treaty's broad
negative definition of political offense, the apparent effect would have been a shift of author-
ity to the executive.
139. 132 CONG. REC. S9148 (daily ed. July 16, 1986) (statement of Sen. Lugar).
140. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
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sought establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the request
for extradition has been made for reasons of that person's race, reli-
gion, nationality, or political opinions, or that the person would be
prejudiced at trial or punished for any of these reasons.1 42
The Senate's insistence in the Compromise Treaty on an affirma-
tive role for U.S. courts in extradition requests involving the political
offense exception, however, risks reopening the judicial loophole
which the Submitted Treaty sought to close. The Submitted Treaty
would have allowed extradition upon the establishment of probable
cause, although the executive always retained discretion to deny the
extradition request. 143 Under the Compromise Treaty, however, a sig-
142. See supra note 93. In floor debate, Senator Kerry inserted the following colloquy
among himself, Senator Biden, and Senator Lugar, the Chairman of the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations, "[t]o assure that a judge would be clear as to what was the commit-
tee's intent as it related to article 3(a)." 132 CONG. RFc. S9253 (daily ed. July 17, 1986).
Senator Kerry: Mr. Chairman, as part of tha [sic] report language I would ask
you if it is your understanding and intention as principal sponsor
of this amendment that an individual, as part of showing that he
would, and I quote the language of article 8 (now article 3), "if
surrendered be prejudiced at his trial or punished, detained or
restricted in his personal liberty by reason of his race, religion,
nationality or political opinion," would that individual be able to
challenge the fairness of the judicial system to which he would be
returned and thereby raise a right of inquire [sic] into the fairness
of that system?
Mr. Chairman: Yes.
Senator Kerry: And that is your intention in this particular amendment as well
as in the treaty?
The Chairman: That is correct.
Senator Biden: Let me make sure as part of this colloquy that I understand the
nature of the rule of inquiry into the justice system in Northern
Ireland that we are establishing here.
My understanding is this: That notwithstanding that probable
cause has been established in an American court; notwithstand-
ing that the accused is the person sought; notwithstanding that it
is an extraditable offense under the terms of this treaty we are
about to vote on; and notwithstanding that otherwise it is an
offense for which extradition would lie; and notwithstanding all
of that, the defendant will have an opportunity in Federal court
to introduce evidence that he or she would personally, because of
their race, religion, nationality or political opinion, not be able to
get a fair trial because the court system or any other aspect of the
judicial system in the requesting country, or that the person's
extradition has been requested with a view to try to punish them
on account of their race, their religion, their nationality or polit-
ical opinion.
The Chairman: My answer is yes.
Id. The colloquy also appeared in Floor statements by Senator Levin, id. at S9259, and
Senator Biden, id at S9260.
143. Once the magistrate certifies an approved extradition to the Secretary of State, the
Secretary still possesses the executive discretion to deny the request. For example, the
executive has authority to withhold extradition for humanitarian reasons. See Peroff v.
Hylton, 542 F.2d 1247 (4th Cir. 1976). Relief is also available in the form of asylum. In
the United States, asylum claims are governed by the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8
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nificant role for the courts remains even after the establishment of
probable cause.
First, the accused retains the right to force judicial inquiry into
the administration of Northern Ireland's justice system. Under the
Submitted Treaty, such a right of inquiry did not exist in the context
of a political offense defense, demonstrating absolute U.S. opposition
to the use of terrorism as a means of effecting political change in a
democracy. More importantly, U.S. courts are neither equipped nor
intended to make judgments about the internal politics of foreign
states.
Second, article III's various defenses to extradition are couched in
general and imprecise language. Despite the assurance of Senator
Lugar, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, that
even under the Compromise Treaty, Mackin "would, without ques-
tion, have been decided against the defendant," 14 the Compromise
Treaty may in fact provide a loophole for such defendants. For exam-
ple, even if a defendant like Mackin could not find protection under
the Compromise Treaty's political offense exception, he still could
plausibly argue-in the words of article III-that the extradition
request was made to try or punish him for his political views. Thus
the Prior Treaty's unacceptably vague discretionary power, which the
Submitted Treaty would have abolished, reappears in the Compromise
Treaty as article III.
Even though the Compromise Treaty closes one terrorist loop-
hole in the form of the political offense exception, it reopens another
loophole, in the form of the various article III rights of inquiry. The
extent to which those sought for extradition will be successful in abus-
ing this reopened loophole remains to be seen. Such abuse would have
been impossible under the Submitted Treaty.
V. CONCLUSION
International law recognizes no duty to extradite; rather, extradi-
tion law exists to further cooperation between nations for purposes of
maintaining the lawful order and security on which all liberty ulti-
mately depends. The political offense exception, however, enables sov-
ereign nations to refuse to extradite, for humane or ideological
reasons, certain defendants who would otherwise be extraditable
under the legal obligations created between two nations.
U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158 (1982), and by the regulations of the Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service, 8 C.F.R. § 208 (1986). According to the State Department, "[t]he Sup-
plementary Treaty would not revise... provisions of law, nor affect their application in
practice. The Supplementary Treaty relates solely to the extradition process, not to the
application of our immigration laws." Committee Hearings, supra note 52, at 701.
144. 132 CONG. REc. S9148 (daily ed. July 16, 1986) (statement of Sen. Lugar).
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Each nation must determine how far it will extend the political
offense exception, based on its own political values. The Supplemen-
tary Extradition Treaty reflects a determination by both the United
States and the United Kingdom that the political offense exception
ought not be used to shield from justice individuals who would destroy
the freedoms and lives of others to gain political advantage. In a prac-
tical sense, the Supplementary Treaty is a reasonable and responsible
solution to the demonstrated terrorist loophole in the prior extradition
treaty between the United States and the United Kingdom. Although
the Submitted Treaty would have closed this loophole more effec-
tively, the Compromise Treaty is nonetheless a major reform, worthy
of support.
Douglas A. Fellman
